DO NOT DELETE

4/21/2009 2:53:34 PM

PUBLIC SCHOOL OBLIGATIONS TO
PAY PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION:
REINTERPRETING THE I.D.E.A. IN
FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT
v. T.A.
E. CHANEY HALL*

1
Like many high school students, T.A. had trouble in school.
Unlike most high school students, T.A.’s problems were related to his
2
undiagnosed Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). He
found it difficult to concentrate and to complete his assignments, but
with the help of his supportive parents and sister he was able to pass
his classes.3 T.A.’s guidance counselor noticed that T.A. was struggling
and, suspecting that T.A. might have a learning disability, referred him
to the school psychologist to be evaluated for possible special
education services.4 T.A.’s school responded quickly, and the school
district’s team of psychologists and specialists determined that he
5
might have ADHD.
For about six months following the initial evaluation, the school
district had psychologists and educational specialists test T.A. to
6
determine if he had a learning disability. The school district’s staff
met with T.A.’s parents to discuss his difficulties in school, but they
never disclosed that they suspected T.A. might have ADHD or that

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. In court documents, which are public records accessible by all, minors are identified
only by their initials to protect their identity.
2. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing
T.A.’s troubles in school and the school district’s evaluation that suggested T.A. might have
ADHD).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. (discussing the evaluation process, which lasted from Dec. 2000, when the
guidance counselor wrote T.A. a referral for evaluation, until the meeting in June 2001, when
the school district staff and T.A.’s mother agreed that T.A. did not have a learning disability).
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7
they had evaluated him for ADHD. The team of specialists
determined, and T.A.’s parents agreed, that T.A. did not have a
learning disability and therefore was not eligible for special education
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).8
9
Shortly after the meeting, T.A. began using marijuana. His drug
use had become regular by the following year, and he began to exhibit
10
behavioral disturbances. T.A.’s parents took him to a psychologist,
who diagnosed T.A. with ADHD, depression, math disorder, and
11
marijuana abuse. The psychologist recommended that T.A.’s parents
place him in a three week residential program, and they complied.12
Following his discharge, T.A.’s parents placed him in a residential
private school designed for children with academic and behavioral
difficulties.13
His parents then requested a due process hearing under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f) of the IDEA to challenge the school’s determination that
T.A. was ineligible for special education benefits and to obtain
14
reimbursement for the private school tuition. In response to the
initiation of the hearing, the school district reevaluated T.A. for
learning disabilities and again determined that T.A. was not eligible
for special education under the IDEA.15 But the hearing officer
overseeing T.A.’s due process hearing determined that the school
district was to reimburse T.A.’s parents for private school tuition
because, contrary to the school’s finding, T.A. was eligible for special
education under the IDEA and the school district had failed to offer
T.A. a free appropriate public education (FAPE).16

7. Id.
8. Id. If T.A. had been eligible under the IDEA, the school would have been obligated to
take additional steps to ensure that he received an education that appropriately met his
individual needs. See infra text accompanying notes 31–44 (discussing the IDEA and eligibility
requirements).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1082.
11. Id. at 1081–82.
12. Id. at 1082.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1082–83 (explaining that the hearing officer determined that the school district
was responsible for the costs of the private school, but not for the costs of the rehabilitation
center, because the school district failed to provide T.A. with the minimum level of education, a
FAPE, mandated by the IDEA).
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The school district appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, which
determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C) of the IDEA barred T.A.’s parents
17
from receiving tuition reimbursement. Upon T.A.’s appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C) does not act as a
statutory bar against private school tuition reimbursement to parents
whose IDEA-eligible child never received special education services
at public school.18
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari upon
19
the school district’s appeal. The question before the Court is whether
the
1997
amendments
of
the
IDEA,
specifically
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), bar parents of a child with disabilities from
receiving private school tuition reimbursement when the child did not
previously receive special education services at the public school.20
The Court will view this case in light of the previous decisions on
21
point. An equally divided Court affirmed without opinion a Second
Circuit case, Board of Education v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F.22 In that
case, the Second Circuit had issued a summary order reversing the
district court’s decision and remanding for the district court to decide
the case23 in compliance with the Second Circuit’s holding in Frank G.
v. Board of Education. 24 Frank G. held that the 1997 amendments did
not bar parents from receiving reimbursement when their child had
25
not previously received special education services at school. The
26
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Frank G.
The Court in the pending case will revisit the interpretation of the
1997 amendments to the IDEA to more clearly resolve the circuit

17. Id. at 1083.
18. Id. at 1086.
19. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009).
20. Brief of Petitioner at (i), Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (Feb. 25, 2009).
21. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the opinion, so the Court was split four to four in
its decision. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 129 S. Ct. at 987. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F.,
128 S. Ct. 1 (2007).
22. Id.
23. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2006) (not
reported).
24. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
25. Id. at 376 (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not bar private tuition reimbursement
when the school district knew, before the child’s removal from public school, that the child
needed special education services).
26. Id.
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27
28
29
split between the Second, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits, finding
that parents could receive tuition reimbursement when their child had
never received special education at public school, and the First
30
Circuit, holding that they could not. The Court should decide that
parents whose children did not previously receive special education in
public school may receive tuition reimbursement under the IDEA at
the court’s discretion as a matter of equity.

I. THE IDEA
The purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs.”31 A free appropriate public education
(FAPE) must include “special education and related services”32 and
must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
33
educational benefits.” The Court has emphasized that a FAPE is a
low standard, explaining that “the Act was more to open the door of
public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than
to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”34

27. Frank G., 459 F.3d 356; Tom F., 193 Fed. App’x 26.
28. M .M .ex rel.C.M .v.Sch.Bd.,437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir.2006)(holding thata child w ho never
attended public school but did receive early childhood special educational services from a public
agency is not statutorily barred from receiving private schooltuition reim bursem ent w hen the school
districtfailed to provide a FA PE).
29. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
30. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004),
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2005).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9), (14), (26), and (29); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
181–82 (1982) (defining a FAPE in the context of the IDEA’s precursor, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA)).
33. The Supreme Court interpreted the FAPE provision in the EAHCA in Rowley, 458
U.S. at 181–82. The Court set forth a two part test. First, courts should ask whether the state
complied with the Act’s procedures, then the court should ask whether the IEP was “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. at 206–07.
34. Id. at 192. For example, the Tenth Circuit determined in Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v.
Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. Ct.1356 (2009), that parents
could not receive tuition reimbursement because their son was making progress in public school
in accordance with his IEP even though he was exhibiting severe behavioral problems (such as
tantrums, violent behavior at home and in public, difficulties sleeping, regression in toilet
training, and spreading bowel movements over his bedroom). The court cited Rowley, 548 U.S.
at 201 n.23, in determining that the IDEA does not oblige schools to ensure the “self
sufficiency” of all disabled children, rather the IDEA provides school districts with broad
discretion in developing an IEP. Id. at 1151.
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A school must develop an individual education plan (IEP) for a
child with disabilities in order to meet the FAPE requirement. An
IEP is “a comprehensive statement of the [child’s] educational needs .
. . and the specially designed instruction and related services” that the
35
school agrees to implement. Determining the content and goals of
the IEP is a collaborative effort by the child’s parents, school
36
administrators, and other specialists, though the Court gives broad
deference to the school administration’s choices in developing an
IEP.37 A school district that is unable to provide a FAPE for a child
with disabilities can refer the student to a private school at no cost to
his parents, but the school district must pay the tuition and other
expenses.38
A parent dissatisfied with the school’s treatment of his child is
entitled to a due process hearing presided over by a state-appointed
hearing officer.39 Either the parent or the school district may appeal
40
the hearing officer’s decision in federal court and the courts have
broad discretion to craft relief to remedy IDEA violations.41 For
example, the Supreme Court in School Committee of Town of
42
Burlington v. Department of Education decided that, under the
provision authorizing the court to “grant such relief as the court
determines is appropriate,”43 a court may order the school to
reimburse parents for private school tuition after determining both
that the IEP was inappropriate and that the private placement was
appropriate to meet the child’s needs.44
The legal controversy between the circuit courts arises from the
1997 amendments to the IDEA, specifically 20 U.S.C.

35. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
37. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i).
39. Id. at § 1415(b)(6).
40. Id. at § 1415(f).
41. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
42. Id. (interpreting the Education of the Handicapped Act).
43. Now ,embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2005). This provision has not been
changed since the time of the Burlington decision. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d at 369.
44. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (“In a case where a court determines that a private
placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for
placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that ‘appropriate’
relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and
implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school.”) The Court
reaffirmed this standard in Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1993).
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§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), entitled “Reimbursement for Private School
Placement.” The statute reads:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a
public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or
secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to
reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court
or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free
appropriate public education available to the child in a timely
45
manner prior to that enrollment.

The Second Circuit determined that the statute did not foreclose
this remedy for children who never received special education
services, rather it merely provided additional rules for parents whose
children did previously receive special education at public school.46
The First Circuit, by contrast, interpreted this provision as overruling
the Court’s prior holdings that a court may award tuition
reimbursement to a parent whose child had not previously received
special education services.47
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF REIMBURSEMENT
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the 1997
amendments to the IDEA do not bar parents from recovering the
cost of private school for a child who did not receive special education
48
and related services at public school. The Second Circuit heard two
cases concerning the interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). In Board
of Education v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., the Southern District of New
York relied on Greenland School District v. Amy N. in deciding that
“where a child has not previously received special education from a

45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
46. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373–74 (explaining that Congress intended to limit the availability
of private tuition reimbursement when a child had previously received special education
services from a public agency).
47. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 159–60 (2004). One such case was
Carter, 510 U.S. at 9–10 (holding that a court may award private school tuition reimbursement
to parents who withdraw their child from a public school that is not providing a FAPE and place
him in a private school that does not meet all of IDEA’s requirements).
48. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 523 F.3d at 1080; Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert
F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26, 26 (2d Cir. 2006) (not reported), aff’d 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007); Frank G. v. Bd.
of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 359 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007).
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public agency, there is no authority to reimburse the tuition expenses
arising from a parent’s unilateral placement of the child in private
49
school.” The Second Circuit issued a summary order reversing and
remanding the judgment of the district court to render a decision in
accordance with Frank G. v. Board of Education, an earlier decision
on the same issue with a detailed opinion.50 The Supreme Court
51
affirmed Tom F. without an opinion.
The Second Circuit in Frank G. held that the 1997 Amendments
to the IDEA did not bar private tuition reimbursement when the
52
child had never received special education in public school. First, the
court considered whether the statute contained a plain and
unambiguous statement about tuition reimbursement under these
53
conditions. The court determined that 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
does not explicitly limit tuition reimbursement to children who
previously received special education from a public agency and it
does not state that tuition reimbursement is unavailable when the
child never received special education through a public agency.54 The
court also pointed out that the portion of the Act upon which School
Committee of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education relied in
authorizing reimbursement, then § 1415(e)(2) and now
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), was not changed in the 1997 amendments.55
The court then assessed the ambiguous statute in terms of the
purposes of the IDEA.56 One of the ways the statute seeks to secure
educational opportunities for children with disabilities is by allowing
courts to grant appropriate relief to parents when the IEP is
inappropriate and parents place their child in private school.57

49. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 2005 WL 22866, at *3.
50. Tom F., 193 Fed. App’x. at 26.
51. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007).
52. Frank G., 459 F.3d at359.
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 369.
56. Id. at 370–71.
57. Id. at 371 (“One of the primary ways in which the IDEA seeks to ensure that children
with disabilities receive a free appropriate education is by conferring broad discretion on the
district court to grant relief it deems appropriate to parents of disabled children who opt for a
unilateral private placement in cases where the parents’ placement is determined to be proper
and the proposed IEP is determined to be inadequate.”).
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Construing the statute to limit the availability of that remedy would
58
undermine the statute’s objective.
Finally, the court said that ambiguous rules should be interpreted
59
so as to avoid absurd results. Requiring children to receive special
education at public school before parents could place them in private
school would mean that some children would have to suffer an
education that fails to meet the statutory FAPE requirements for a
significant period of time before parents could have the right to place
their children in a setting that could provide a FAPE.60
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.61 The court emphasized that the
purpose of the IDEA is to provide a FAPE for children with
disabilities, and barring reimbursement for children who have not
received special education services conflicts with that purpose.62
Section 1412(a)(10)(C) does not apply to children who have not
previously received special education, so their parents may only
receive reimbursement as a matter of equity under § 1415(i)(2)(C).63
The court reiterated that it would be an absurd result to require a
child to “wait (an indefinite, perhaps lengthy period) until [he] has
received special education in public school before sending [him] to an
appropriate private school, no matter how uncooperative the school
district and no matter how inappropriate the special education.”64
Judge Rymer in his dissent agreed with the Second Circuit that
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) “carries forward the pre-1997 law on equitable relief,”
but argued that Burlington and § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not apply in this
case if T.A. was removed from public school because of his drug
65
problem and not an IDEA-eligible disability like ADHD. The IDEA
requires schools to provide a FAPE for a child only if he has a
66
disability recognized by the statute. The dissent stated, “[a] local

58. Id. at 372.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[F]orcing parents into accepting inadequate IEPs in order to preserve their right to
reimbursement runs contrary to the rights recognized in the Burlington line of cases.”).
61. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008).
62. Id. at 1087.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1090 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
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educational agency that has made a FAPE available has no obligation
to pay the cost of education . . . of a child with a disability at a private
67
school when the parents elect the private placement.” If T.A.’s
parents withdrew him from public school for any reason other than
that the school was not accommodating his learning disabilities, then
the school would not be responsible for tuition reimbursement.68
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REIMBURSEMENT
The arguments counseling against reimbursing parents for private
school expenses can be divided into four main categories: 1) a plain
meaning argument; 2) a spending clause argument; 3) a statutory
purpose argument; and 4) a public policy argument focusing on the
financial burdens associated with increased taxpayer liability for
private school tuition.
A. Plain Meaning
Critics of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion argue that the court’s
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C) violated the plain meaning of the
statute. In Greenland School District v. Amy N., the First Circuit held
that the plain meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C) reflected Congress’s intent
to bar tuition reimbursement for children who had never received
special education in public school.69 In supporting this conclusion, the
court relied on a report from the Committee on Education and the
Workforce recommending that Congress revise the statute to require
children to receive special education services in public school before
parents can be reimbursed for private school tuition.70
The school district similarly argues that the plain language of the
statute creates an inference that the statute bars reimbursement by
71
relying on other parts of the statute. For example, the headings of
the statute’s titles suggest that Congress was setting forth school
72
Additionally,
obligations to provide tuition reimbursement.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) places restrictions on receipt of private school
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1091.
69. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004).
70. Id. at 159 (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 105-95 at 90 (1997)).
71. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 20, at 19–21.
72. Id. at 24 (discussing the heading of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii): “Reimbursement for
Private School Placement”).
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tuition reimbursement for children who previously received special
73
education at public school. Finally, the equitable remedy in
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) is only available at the discretion of the court, whereas
either a hearing officer or the courts may grant the remedies under
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).74 The fact that Congress provided a remedial
scheme for obtaining private tuition reimbursement when the child
received special education services at public school may suggest that
the remedy was only to be available for children falling within
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii): children who previously received special
education and related services from a public agency, did not receive a
FAPE from the public school, and were enrolled in private school
without their school districts’ consent.75
B. Spending Clause
The school district argues that the Spending Clause bars parents
from receiving tuition reimbursement for a child who never received
special education services at the public school.76 Congress passed the
IDEA under its Spending Clause authority, and therefore must
provide states with “clear notice” of the need to reimburse parents for
private school tuition when the parents’ child never received special
education services at a public school.77 The school district argued that,
after the 1997 revisions, schools did not have notice that they could be
liable to parents for these expenses because the statute addresses
tuition reimbursement only for children who previously received
special education services from the state, and it is not readily apparent
that schools could be liable to children who never received special
education.78 Schools should not be liable to this class of plaintiffs, the
petitioner contends, until Congress or the courts provide notice that
the school may be required to provide private tuition reimbursement
under these circumstances.79

73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 24–25.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16–17.
77. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7–9, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (Feb. 25,
2009) (citing Arlington Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (finding
that the IDEA, as a spending clause statute, is subject to the clear notice rule)).
78. Brief of Petitioner at 18–19, supra note 20.
79. Id.
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The respondent countered that this argument was meritless
because the remedy sought “merely enforces the Spending Clause
80
contract.” Allowing parents to receive tuition reimbursement is a
remedy for a violation of a substantive right—the child’s right to a
FAPE—so schools are on notice that they may be liable to parents
and children if they violate their obligations under the IDEA.81
Ultimately, the petitioner’s spending clause argument is likely to be
unavailing because courts have previously recognized the availability
of tuition reimbursement for similarly situated students,82 and the
language of the statute does not explicitly exclude these parents from
receiving reimbursement.
C. Statutory Purpose
The original purpose of the IDEA was to provide a FAPE to
children with disabilities, because they received insufficient education
prior to the Act’s adoption.83 Reimbursing a parent for private school
is a last resort that is only available when public school fails to
84
provide the disabled child with an appropriate education. In an
effort to provide education in a public school setting, the IDEA
provides a collaborative framework to encourage good faith
cooperation between parents and the school.85 This cooperative
framework requires that the school system have the opportunity to

80. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 29, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305
(Feb. 25, 2009).
81. See id. at 28–29 (citing Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.
516 (2007) (rejecting the argument that the IDEA did not provide clear notice of parents’ rights
because recognizing parents’ rights did not impose any obligations on the school that they were
not already required to observe)).
82. See discussion of Burlington, supra text accompanying notes 42–44, and of the First
Circuit’s holding in Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004),
supra text accompanying note 47.
83. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Boards Ass’n, Am. Ass’n of Sch. Admin. and Nat’l Ass’n of State
Directors of Special Educ. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Forest Grove Sch. Dist.
v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Oct. 6, 2008) (citing Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51–52
(2005), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2), and Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982)).
84. Id. at 10; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 5–7, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Mar. 4, 2009) (explaining that
Congress has two goals in ensuring a public education for children with disabilities: that they
would receive an education in a more constructive learning environment and that their
education would be as cost effective as possible (citing S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 9)).
85. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 12–13; Brief of City of New York as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–13, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Feb.
25, 2009) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)).
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determine whether it can provide a FAPE to a child before his
86
parents withdraw him from public school. Critics of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove School District v. T.A. argue that it
“will encourage parents not to collaborate with public school districts
because to do so will disadvantage them if they later seek privateschool tuition reimbursement.”87 But § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) eliminates
that concern. It states that courts may deny or reduce reimbursement
if parents do not notify the school that they intend to place the child
in a private school.88 This supports the argument that parents must
give the school the opportunity to provide a FAPE before they can
89
receive reimbursement for private school. The Ninth Circuit’s
holding does not disturb this requirement.
D. Costs of Education
Several of the amici briefs raise concerns about the burdens that
tuition reimbursement for children not previously enrolled in special
education will place on the educational and judicial systems. Schools
will be unable to anticipate their liability because any student could
potentially receive private tuition reimbursement, and the cost of
placing a child in private school averages about $26,000—more than
four times the cost per child in public school.90 Two amicus briefs
suggested that this uncertainty will make it difficult for schools to
91
create a workable budget and will divert special education funds
from students who remain at public school.92 Furthermore, due
process hearings alone are costly,93 and schools may try to settle or to
94
make “bad faith offers to avoid litigation.”

86. Brief of City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 85;
Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160 (stating that requiring a student to receive special education services
at the school first “serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity,
before the child is removed, to . . . determine whether a free appropriate public education can
be provided in the public schools”).
87. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 11.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2005).
89. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 16.
90. Id. at 23; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch., supra note 84, at 23.
91. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 20–21.
92. Brief of Council of the Great City Schools, supra note 84, at 28–29.
93. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 23 (explaining that the hearings cost
around $10,000 on average).
94. Michael T. McCarthy, Don’t Get the Wrong IDEA: How the Fourth Circuit Misread the
Words and Spirit of Special Education Law—And How to Fix It, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1707,
1742–43 (2008) (“If some parents abuse the IEP process to place their children in appealing

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

4/21/2009 2:53:34 PM

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT V. T.A.

421

The amici briefs also caution that the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation creates an unfair litigation advantage for parents that
95
will encourage a flood of litigation. If a school district never
provided special education services, then it would be hard to prove
96
that they provided a FAPE. This problem of proof, argue the amici
briefs, creates incentives for parents who want to place their children
in private schools and play the “tuition-reimbursement lottery” to try
to have the public school pay the private school tuition.97
Whether this is actually a problem is questionable. Because of the
high cost of tuition, parents are unlikely to place a child in a private
school if they have little reasonable belief that they will receive
98
reimbursement. Even when parents have a reasonable belief that
they will prevail, many may be unable to afford private school tuition
while they navigate the due process hearing. Others that could
temporarily pay the cost of tuition may be unwilling to risk that the
hearing could be decided against them.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RENDER A DECISION
ALLOWING TUITION REIMBURSEMENT AS A MATTER OF EQUITY
The amendments to the IDEA narrowed the scope of tuition
reimbursement for students who are currently receiving special
education in schools.99 Given this indication of congressional intent, it
is reasonable to similarly restrict, but not completely eliminate, tuition
reimbursement for students who have not previously received special
education. The Supreme Court should articulate a clearer standard
drawing on the Second Circuit decision in Frank G. v. Board of
Education and the Court’s prior holding in School Committee of Town
of Burlington v. Department of Education.

private schools . . . , other children will suffer when public school systems make bad faith offers
to avoid litigation based on procedural defects.”).
95. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 25.
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 25; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch., supra note 84, at 27–28.
98. Logan Steiner, Playing Lawyers: The Implications of Endowing Parents with
Substantive Rights under IDEA in Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S. Ct. 1994
(2007), 31 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1169, 1174 (2008) (quoting Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Winkelman).
99. See discussion of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), supra text accompanying notes 45–46
(explaining statutory limitations on private tuition reimbursement for parents whose child
received special education through a public agency).
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The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA do not explicitly prohibit
tuition reimbursement when a child with disabilities has not
previously received special education funds from public school.
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) states only that parents of a child who
previously received special education may receive tuition
reimbursement, but it does not contain any language suggesting that
children who had not received special education should be ineligible
for reimbursement. The statute provides different remedial schemes
for children who did previously receive special education than for
those who did not. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) allows either a court or
a hearing officer to award reimbursement to parents whose child did
previously receive special education services, subject to the limitations
in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). As discussed above, many courts over the past
several decades have awarded tuition reimbursement as a matter of
equity under § 1415(i)(2)(C) to children who never received special
education at public school.100 As the report of Committee on
Education and the Workforce confirms, Congress was fully aware of
the availability of this remedy.101 If Congress had intended to
eliminate the availability of this remedy, it was well within its
authority to state as much in the statute. The fact that the
Committee’s recommendation was not reflected in the version of the
statute that was adopted is indicative of Congressional intent on this
matter.
Although Congress did not eliminate the availability of tuition
reimbursement for children who never received public school special
education, the 1997 amendments did place additional restrictions on
the availability of reimbursement. The most important limitation was
provided in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), which states:
this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay
for the cost of education, including special education and related
services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if
that agency made a free appropriate public education available to
the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private
102
school or facility.

100. See supra note 47 (discussing prior holdings that found an equitable remedy under the
IDEA for tuition reimbursement) and text accompanying note 55 (discussing relief under
§1415(i)(2)(C)).
101. See supra text accompanying note 70 (discussing the Committee Report).
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
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This provision does not contain the limiting language of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), which applies only when the child previously
received special education. This absence of limiting language suggests
that the statute applies to all instances in which parents wish to
receive tuition reimbursement. Thus, when the public school “ma[kes]
a FAPE available,” a parent is not eligible to receive private school
tuition reimbursement regardless of whether his child previously
received special education.
The provision does not provide any guidance as to the relevant
time period in assessing whether the school made a FAPE available.
The statute’s “made available” language does not distinguish between
a FAPE provided before the parent removed the child from public
school and a FAPE that is to be provided in the future. Because a
FAPE may be “made available” to a student even after he is
withdrawn from school, courts should interpret “made available”
broadly to include both prior and prospective educational
opportunities.
The Court should recognize, in light of the 1997 Amendments and
the competing policy concerns discussed above, a rebuttable
presumption against private school tuition reimbursement when the
child has not previously received special education and related
services at a public school. Parents may receive reimbursement if the
child has a disability rendering him eligible for benefits under the
103
104
IDEA, the school violated the procedural provisions of the IDEA,
the school did not provide the child with an education reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits prior to
withdrawal,105 the child’s parents notified the school of their intent to
place the child in private school or otherwise gave the school the
106
opportunity to evaluate the child and develop an IEP, and the

103. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2008); M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir.
2006).
104. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
105. Id.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2005) (providing that reimbursement for a child who
previously received special education may be limited or denied if the parent did not provide
notice of intent to withdraw, except in certain circumstances, e.g., the school prevented the
parent from providing notice); Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 766 F. Supp. 852 (D. Or.
1991); see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 158–59 (2004) (explaining that,
prior to the 1997 amendments, several courts required parents to give notice before removing
their children from public school).
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school does not have a plan to provide a FAPE or the current IEP is
107
inadequate to meet his needs should he return to school.
Recognizing this rebuttable presumption provides the best
balance between the interests of the school and the child. The Court
has traditionally afforded broad deference to schools about their
108
decisions regarding the best interests of their students. The
assumption underlying this deference is that a school is in a better
position than a court to assess students’s needs and that schools
generally perform their duties adequately.109 To allow parents to
obtain reimbursement for the cost of private school too easily would
suggest that schools are incompetent at providing an appropriate
education for a broad class of children with disabilities. Because
courts operate on the belief that schools are generally competent
educational providers, private school should be a last resort available
only in circumstances where the school is unable (or perhaps
unwilling) to provide a FAPE.110
Providing school administrators with deference to identify a
disabled student’s educational needs requires that courts not
unreasonably interfere with school administration, and part of school
administration is budgeting. The cost of private school tuition is
substantial, so opening the door too wide for parents to receive
tuition reimbursement would interfere with a school’s ability to
budget its expenses and to provide a quality education for all of its
students. Accordingly, courts should not endorse a policy that would
significantly impair a school’s ability to provide for the education of
its students.

107. See supra discussion of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), text accompanying notes 100–101
(explaining that parents may not receive tuition reimbursement if the public school provided a
FAPE and suggesting that the school may meet the FAPE requirement via a prospective IEP).
108. See supra text accompanying note 42 (explaining the Court’s statement in Burlington
that the statutory provision grants courts broad deference in determining the appropriate
remedy).
109. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208–09 (1982) (“The primary
responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for
choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the Act to state
and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.”); id. at
211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the district court for failing to grant adequate
deference to the state’s Commissioner of Education and the hearing officer).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44 (explaining that the statute authorizes courts
to award relief when the schools provide an inappropriate education), 99–101 (discussing
restrictions on tuition reimbursement when the school did provide or will provide a FAPE).
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But courts must also provide a remedy for children with
disabilities when their school fails to provide to them an adequate
education. It is unknown how many children, like T.A., struggle with
their studies for years before teachers or staff even suspect that they
111
might have a learning disability. Even if the school does suspect a
learning disability, they may not inform the parents of their
112
assessment. Evaluating whether a student has a disability that
qualifies him for IDEA benefits is a lengthy process113 and may not
produce change if a child’s education is not sufficiently impaired.114 If
a parent disagrees with the school’s decision, they must tolerate a due
process hearing—another lengthy process. Any reasonable parent,
believing his child is impaired by a learning disability, would attempt
to obtain the educational resources necessary for his child quickly, not
wait years for an uncertain result.
T.A.’s parents, however, probably would not qualify for tuition
reimbursement under this standard. As the Ninth Circuit’s dissent
noted, T.A.’s parents removed T.A. from public school primarily
115
because of his drug problem, not because of his ADHD. This creates
questions of fact for the trial court as to whether the school actually
failed to provide a FAPE before T.A. was removed from public school
and as to whether the school failed to provide an adequate IEP for
him to return to public school.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should hold, consistently with its prior
opinions, that courts may grant, as a matter of their equitable
discretion, private school tuition reimbursement for a child who did
not previously receive special education or related services under

111. Recall that T.A.’s guidance counselor, not his teachers, prompted the inquiry. Supra
text accompanying note 4.
112. Recall that the Forest Grove School District did not tell T.A.’s parents that he had
been evaluated for ADHD until much later. Supra text accompanying note 8.
113. T.A.’s evaluation took about nine months. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d
1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
114. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing the school’s determination that T.A.
was ineligible under the IDEA because his ADHD “did not have a severe effect on [his]
educational performance”).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 9–13 (explaining that T.A.’s parents removed him
from public school because of his behavioral difficulties and drug problem and placed him in a
rehabilitation center).
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§ 1415(i)(2)(C) of the IDEA. To guide lower courts that must decide
whether to grant tuition reimbursement, the Court should articulate a
presumption against reimbursement that the parents may overcome
by showing that their child was eligible for and denied IDEA benefits,
that the parents gave the school the opportunity to remedy the
situation, and that the school refused or was unable. Because there is
doubt as to whether T.A. was denied a FAPE and as to whether the
school could have provided him with a FAPE, the Court should
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and remand for factual
determinations.

